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Abstract
One popular approach to statistical mechanics understands statistical mechanical
probabilities as measures of rational indifference. Naive formulations of this “indif-
ference approach” face reversibility worries – while they yield the right prescriptions
regarding future events, they yield the wrong prescriptions regarding past events. This
paper begins by showing how the indifference approach can overcome the standard re-
versibility worries by appealing to the Past Hypothesis. But, the paper argues, positing
a Past Hypothesis doesn’t free the indifference approach from all reversibility worries.
For while appealing to the Past Hypothesis allows it to escape one kind of reversibil-
ity worry, it makes it susceptible to another – the Meta-Reversibility Objection. And
there is no easy way for the indifference approach to escape the Meta-Reversibility
Objection. As a result, reversibility worries pose a steep challenge to the viability of
the indifference approach.
1 Introduction
Statistical mechanics is an inherently probabilistic theory. It explains thermodynamic
phenomena – the diffusion of milk poured into a cup of hot cocoa, the cooling of the
cup of hot cocoa when it’s carried out into the snow – by assigning high probabilities
to such events. And it explains the absence of anti-thermodynamic behavior – the
separation and ejection of all of the milk from a cup of hot cocoa, the spontaneous
warming of a cup of hot cocoa left outside – by assigning small probabilities to such
events.
But how to understand these probabilities is a contentious issue. The recent pro-
posals in the literature can be roughly divided into two camps.1 One view of statistical
1Those who defend a “typicality” approach to statistical mechanics might not seem to fit into either of
these camps (see Goldstein (2001) and Maudlin (2007) for a description of such views). As I understand
it, however, this approach is not a competitor to the ones described here. Rather, the typicality approach
crosscuts the divide between these two camps, and could be adopted (or rejected) by proponents of both
nomic and indifference approaches.
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mechanical probabilities, recently defended by Albert (2000) and Loewer (2001), un-
derstands them as chances, i.e., physical probabilities given by the laws of nature.2
I’ll call this the nomic approach to statistical mechanics (and accounts of statistical
mechanics in this vein nomic accounts), since it maintains that statistical mechanical
probabilities are lawful or nomic features of the world.
The other view of statistical mechanical probabilities understands them as mea-
sures of rational indifference. On this view, the statistical mechanical probabilities
represent the credences that an ideally rational agent would adopt about a system,
given only certain information about what that system is like. These probabilities
don’t come from the laws, they come from a priori constraints on rational belief (often
called “Indifference Principles”). I’ll call this the indifference approach to statistical
mechanics (and accounts of statistical mechanics in this vein indifference accounts),
since it maintains that statistical mechanical probabilities are the credences prescribed
by Indifference Principles.
Initial formulations of nomic and indifference accounts face “reversibility wor-
ries” – while these accounts yield the right results regarding future events, they yield
the wrong results regarding past events (see section 3). But in both cases it seems
one can overcome these reversibility worries by modifying these accounts to include
something like the Past Hypothesis – a law requiring a particular low-entropy initial
condition to obtain – as discussed by Albert (2000).
In this paper, I argue that this parity between nomic and indifference accounts is
illusory. For while appealing to a Past Hypothesis suffices to free nomic accounts from
reversibility worries, it doesn’t suffice to free indifference accounts from these worries.
More precisely, I show that both nomic and indifference accounts can escape the
standard reversibility worries – what I’ll call the Reversibility Objection – by appeal-
ing to the Past Hypothesis. But by positing a Past Hypothesis, indifference accounts
become susceptible to another kind of reversibility worry – what I’ll call the Meta-
Reversibility Objection. And I argue that there is no easy way for indifference ac-
counts to escape the Meta-Reversibility Objection. Thus reversibility considerations
give us a strong reason to favor nomic accounts over indifference accounts.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 I provide some back-
ground regarding Bayesianism and statistical mechanics, present some assumptions,
and describe the accounts of statistical mechanics I’ll focus on in more detail.
In section 3 I discuss the Reversibility Objection to the initial formulations of the
nomic and indifference accounts. I begin the section with a rough description of the
worries motivating the Reversibility Objection. In section 3.1 I provide a more rigor-
ous characterization of the Reversibility Objection. This allows us to see the possible
replies to the Reversibility Objection, and provides us with some of the tools we need
to set up the Meta-Reversibility Objection. In section 3.2 I assess these replies, and
2A number of other people have followed Albert and Loewer in advocating something like the nomic
approach to statistical mechanics, including Winsberg (2008), Callender and Cohen (2009), and Frigg and
Hoefer (2010).
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show why there’s pressure to follow Albert in adopting a lawful constraint on initial
conditions, the Past Hypothesis.
In section 4 I turn to the Meta-Reversibility Objection to the more sophisticated
versions of the indifference accounts. I begin with a rough description of the worries
motivating the Meta-Reversibility Objection, and explain why similar worries don’t
arise for nomic accounts. In section 4.1 I provide a more rigorous characterization
of the Meta-Reversibility Objection. In section 4.2 I assess the possible replies to the
Meta-Reversibility Objection. I argue that none of the available options provide the
proponent of the indifference approach with a satisfying reply. I conclude with some
brief remarks in section 5.
For those already familiar with these issues, here is a more detailed sketch of the
dialectic that leads to the Meta-Reversibility Objection. The initial formulations of the
nomic and indifference accounts, which impose no constraints on initial conditions,
are unsatisfactory because they assign the wrong values to past events. This is the
Reversibility Objection. We can escape this objection by adopting something like the
Past Hypothesis (PH), a lawful constraint that requires a particular low-entropy initial
condition to obtain. With this addition, the nomic and indifference accounts will assign
the right values to past events.
But note that there are other lawful constraints on initial conditions one could
adopt, such as the “Past Hypothesis∗” (PH∗), which requires that some high-entropy
initial condition obtain. Given something like PH∗, the nomic and indifference ac-
counts will again assign the wrong values to past events. I’ll argue in section 4 that
there is pressure on the indifference approach (though not the nomic approach) to take
PH∗ to be much more likely than PH. And if the indifference approach takes PH∗ to
be much more likely than PH, then the wrong values it assigns to past events given
PH∗ will swamp the right values it assigns to past events given PH. So, when all is
said and done, it’ll again assign the wrong values to past events. This, in a nutshell, is
the Meta-Reversibility Objection.
2 Background
2.1 Rational Agents
For the purposes of this paper, I’ll be restricting my attention to rational agents. I as-
sume that the belief states of such agents can be represented with a credence function,
cr, which takes propositions as arguments, and spits out real numbers between 0 and
1, which represent the agent’s degree of confidence that the proposition is true.
I assume that rational agents are Bayesian, in that their credences satisfy the fol-
lowing pair of constraints:
Probabilism: An agent’s credences should satisfy the probability axioms.3
3That is, an agent’s credence function cr, defined over an algebra A over Ω, should be such that: (1)
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Conditionalization: If an agent with credences cr receives E as evidence, then her
new credences cr+ should be:
cr+(A) = cr(A|E), if defined.4 (1)
Note that Conditionalization doesn’t care about how you break up evidence; con-
ditionalizing on E and then conditionalizing on F yields the same result as condition-
alizing on E ∧F. Thus we can reformulate Conditionalization in terms of an agent’s
initial credence function ic and her total evidence E as follows:5
Conditionalization: If an agent with initial credences ic has total evidence E, then
her credences should be:
crE(A) = ic(A|E), if defined. (2)
I further assume that rational agents satisfy something like Lewis’s (1986) Prin-
cipal Principle, a principle that links their beliefs about propositions to their beliefs
about the chances of those propositions. In particular, let T be a complete chance
theory, let K be some background information that T requires in order to produce a
chance distribution, and let chT K(A) be the chance that T assigns to A given K. Then
I assume that rational agents satisfy the following constraint:
Chance-Credence Principle: An agent’s initial credences ic should be such that:
ic(A|T ∧K) = chT K(A), if defined.6 (3)
Proponents of the indifference approach to statistical mechanics assume that ra-
tional agents also satisfy a further constraint, an Indifference Principle of some sort.
There are many Indifference Principles, but all of the Indifference Principles compati-
ble with Bayesianism take a similar form. We can formulate such principles in terms
of an agent’s initial credences ic and a measure of rational indifference µ, as follows
(where different choices of µ yield different Indifference Principles):
Indifference Principle: An agent’s initial credences ic should be such that:
ic(A) = µ(A).7 (4)
cr(Ω) = 1, (2) ∀A ∈ A, cr(A) ≥ 0, (3) ∀A,B ∈ A, if A∩B = ∅, then cr(A) + cr(B) = cr(A∩B).
4Where cr(A|B)B cr(A∧B)cr(B) .
5Though, of course, this extension only works for agents who have initial credence functions.
6This principle is essentially that proposed by Lewis (1986), with one slight amendment – I’ve replaced
Lewis’s “complete history up to a time” H with a more general background argument K, in order to allow for
statistical mechanical chances. (For some considerations in favor of this kind of formulation of the chance-
credence principle, see Arntzenius (1995), Meacham (2005), Nelson (2009) and Meacham (2010).) As Lewis
and others have noted, this principle is problematic if one adopts a Humean account of chance (see Lewis
(1994), Hall (1994) and Thau (1994)); for the purposes of this paper, I’ll put these issues aside.
7This assumes that we can treat µ as a probability function. Strictly speaking, this isn’t correct (see
Meacham (2005)), and accommodating this fact would require formulating the Indifference Principle in terms
of (say) an equation relating a pair of primitive conditional probabilities. I’ll ignore these complications here.
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An Indifference Principle and Bayesianism together will determine the unique ratio-
nal credence function that an agent with total evidence E should have (i.e., crE(A) =
µ(A|E)).
Not all Indifference Principles are compatible with Bayesianism. A number of
authors, such as Friedman and Shimony (1971) and Dias and Shimony (1981), have
argued that some popular Indifference Principles conflict with Bayesianism.8 But I
take conflicting with Bayesianism to be a reductio of a proposed Indifference Princi-
ple. So I restrict my attention here to Indifference Principles that are compatible with
Bayesianism.
2.2 Statistical Mechanics
Although the issues discussed in this paper are relevant to both classical and quantum
statistical mechanics, I restrict my attention here to classical statistical mechanics.9
Consider a classical world with n particles and three spatial dimensions. The phase
space of this world is a 6n dimensional space representing all of the possible positions
and velocities of these particles.10 Each dimension of the phase space corresponds to
the location or velocity of one of the particles in one of the three spatial directions.
(Thus the locations and velocities of each particle correspond to 6 dimensions.) And
each point in the phase space corresponds to a possible arrangement of particle posi-
tions and velocities, with the point’s position along each dimension encoding the value
of the corresponding location or velocity.
Let a microstate be a complete specification of the locations and velocities of each
particle – this corresponds to a particular point in phase space. Let a macrostate be an
incomplete specification of the locations and velocities of each particle – this corre-
sponds to the region of phase space containing all and only those microstates compat-
ible with that specification.11
To fix on a particular phase space, we need to fix the values of certain parameters,
such as the number of particles, the number of spatial dimensions and the spatial ex-
tension of each dimension. But these details have little bearing on the points at issue.
So to simplify my presentation, I’ll assume that the phase space we’re working with
8Whether these arguments are correct depends on how these principles are understood (see Uffink
(1996)).
9For more on classical statistical mechanics, see Tolman (1979); for more on the philosophical issues
that arise see Sklar (1993) and Albert (2000); for a helpful road-map and source of references regarding the
issues, see North (2011).
10Following Albert, I assume that it’s legitimate to apply statistical mechanics to the world as whole.
Some have resisted this suggestion, arguing that we should restrict the scope of statistical mechanics; for
example see Leeds (2003).
11For convenience, I’ll use the term “macrostate” to refer to the property of a system, to the region of phase
space occupied by microstates with that property, and to the proposition that the system has that property;
context will make it clear how it’s being used. Likewise, I’ll use the name of a macrostate A to refer to the
property, the corresponding region of phase space, and the proposition of the system having that property.
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has been fixed. I describe the somewhat clunkier versions of the central principles and
arguments that take these parameters into consideration in the appendix.
The standard statistical mechanical probabilities are given by the Liouville mea-
sure, i.e., the Lebesgue measure over the canonical representation of the phase space.12
In particular, the statistical mechanical probability of the world being in macrostate A,
given that it’s in macrostate B, is equal to the proportion (according to the Liouville
measure) of B’s microstates that are compatible with A.
Note that we’re assuming deterministic dynamics – given the microstate of the
world at one time, the dynamics determine the microstate of the world at any other
time.13 And note that these dynamics preserve the Liouville measure – the Liouville
measure of any macrostate A is the same as the Liouville measure of any macrostate
A∗ that we can get to by evolving A forwards or backwards in time in accordance
with the dynamics. Thus we can think of any questions about statistical mechanical
probabilities in terms of probabilities over initial conditions: the answer to the question
“what is the probability of A given B (at t)” is always the same as the answer to the
question “what is the probability of the initial conditions having been such that they
would evolve into macrostate A at t, given that we know they’re such that they’ll evolve
into macrostate B at t?”14
For the purposes of this paper, I take an account of statistical mechanics to be an
account which provides at least: (a) a complete specification of the laws, and (b) a
characterization of statistical mechanical probabilities. The discussion in this paper
will focus on four accounts: the initial formulations of the nomic and indifference
accounts (N1 and I1), and the revised formulations of the nomic and indifference ac-
counts that posit a Past Hypothesis (N2 and I2). The discussion of the Reversibility
Objection in section 3 will focus on the first pair of accounts, N1 and I1. The discus-
sion of the Meta-Reversibility Objection in section 4 will focus on the second pair, N2
and I2.
My characterizations of the nomic accounts largely follow Albert (2000). I take
the two nomic accounts, N1 and N2, to be:
N1:
(a) The complete laws are (i) the laws of classical mechanics, and (ii) a Sta-
tistical Postulate, which assigns chances to the (lawfully-permitted) initial
conditions that are proportional to the Liouville measure.
12Or, if we’re holding fixed features of the system (such as its total energy) that reduce the dimensionality
of the macrostates we’re considering, we employ the Lebesgue measure over the canonical representation of
the appropriate sub-space.
13There are exceptions to the claim that classical mechanics is deterministic (see Earman (1986), Xia
(1992) and Norton (2003)), but we can ignore these exceptions for the purposes at hand.
14Assuming, of course, that there are initial conditions. At worlds in which there are not – say, world
which are infinitely temporally extended in both directions – one would have to replace this talk of initial
conditions with talk about the conditions of some “early” time slice. (Similar remarks apply with respect to
the Past Hypothesis presented below.)
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(b) The statistical mechanical probability of A given B is the chance of A given
B assigned by the Statistical Postulate.
N2:
(a) The complete laws are (i) the laws of classical mechanics, (ii) a Statistical
Postulate, which assigns chances to the (lawfully-permitted) initial condi-
tions that are proportional to the Liouville measure, and (iii) a Past Hypoth-
esis, which permits all and only the initial conditions belonging to some
particular low-entropy macrostate.
(b) The statistical mechanical probability of A given B is the chance of A given
B assigned by the Statistical Postulate.
I take the two indifference accounts, I1 and I2, to be:
I1:
(a) The complete laws are (i) the laws of classical mechanics.
(b) An Indifference Principle constrains rational belief. The statistical mechan-
ical probability of A given B is what this Indifference Principle assigns as
the rational initial credence in A conditional on the macrostate B and the
laws.
I2:
(a) The complete laws are (i) the laws of classical mechanics, and (ii) a Past
Hypothesis, which permits all and only the initial conditions belonging to
some particular low-entropy macrostate.
(b) An Indifference Principle constrains rational belief. The statistical mechan-
ical probability of A given B is what this Indifference Principle assigns as
the rational initial credence in A conditional on the macrostate B and the
laws.
These characterizations of I1 and I2 are underspecified, since I haven’t identified
what these Indifference Principles take µ to be. In order to keep my discussion as gen-
eral as possible, I won’t assume much about what µ is like. But I will assume that the
Indifference Principles these accounts employ yield statistical mechanical probabili-
ties that roughly match those assigned by the corresponding nomic account (so that
I1 yields roughly the same statistical mechanical probabilities as N1, and I2 yields
roughly the same statistical mechanical probabilities as N2). That is, I will assume
that:
µ(A|I1∧E) ≈ chN1E(A), (5)
µ(A|I2∧E) ≈ chN2E(A). (6)
Note that these two constraints on µ are compatible. I1 and I2 are disjoint, since I2
entails that there’s a lawful constraint on the initial conditions beyond those imposed
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by the dynamics (the Past Hypothesis), while I1 entails that there is not. Thus (5) and
(6) impose constraints on different parts of logical space, and so won’t conflict.
I assume (5) and (6) in order to focus on the key differences between the nomic
and indifference approaches. The core disagreement between nomic and indifference
approaches isn’t over which probabilities should be assigned in typical statistical me-
chanical cases, but rather over how these probabilities should be understood. For mere
disagreement over which probabilities should be assigned won’t pull the two camps
apart, since for any probability assignment, one can find both a nomic account and an
indifference account that yield that assignment (the nomic account saying that these
values obtain as a matter of natural law, the indifference account saying they obtain in
virtue of a priori constraints on rational belief).
3 The Reversibility Objection
Although initially attractive, the first formulations of the lawful and indifference ac-
counts given above, N1 and I1, run into trouble.
Consider N1. This account yields the right predictions regarding what the future
will be like. It predicts, for instance, that the partially diffused milk in a cup of hot
cocoa will become completely diffused. This is because, according to the Liouville
measure, the overwhelming majority of microstates compatible with the partially-
diffused-milk-in-cocoa macrostate will evolve into microstates in which the milk is
wholly diffused throughout the cocoa. And thus it assigns an overwhelmingly high
chance to the milk becoming wholly diffused.
But N1 seems to yield the wrong predictions regarding what the past was like.
For instance, it predicts that the partially diffused milk in a cup of hot cocoa was
previously completely diffused. This is because, according to the Liouville measure,
the overwhelming majority of microstates compatible with the partially-diffused-milk-
in-cocoa macrostate evolved from microstates in which the milk is wholly diffused
throughout the cocoa. And thus, again, it assigns an overwhelmingly high chance to
the milk having been wholly diffused.
The problem is that N1 makes the same kinds of predictions about the future and
the past. But this seems wrong – thermodynamic phenomena seem to be temporally
asymmetric.
Let’s take this worry one step further. We’ve said that N1 seems to yield the wrong
predictions about the past – predictions that don’t line up with our memories about the
past, our written records about the past, and so on. But why think that our memories
about the past, our written records about the past, and so on, are accurate? For, accord-
ing to the Liouville measure, only a miniscule fraction of the microstates compatible
with our beliefs and records evolved from past microstates that line up with our be-
liefs and records about the past. So if we carry this worry to its logical conclusion, the
concern is that if we believe the account is true, we’re rationally required to believe
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the Skeptical Hypothesis (SH): that our beliefs about the past are wrong.
I1 runs into similar problems. While I1 prescribes beliefs about the future that
line up well with what actually happens, it prescribes beliefs about the past that don’t
line up with our memories, records, etc. So as with N1, I1 requires us to believe that
our memories, records, etc., are wrong. Thus if we believe I1 is true, we’re rationally
required to believe the Skeptical Hypothesis. Call this the Reversibility Objection to
the initial formulations of the nomic and indifference accounts.
3.1 Formalizing the Reversibility Objection
Let’s formulate the Reversibility Objection more precisely. To begin, the argument
needs a way to move from an account yielding skeptical consequences to the account
being false. Thus the argument must assume something like the following:
Adequacy: The correct account of classical statistical mechanics X is such that, given
evidence like ours, one could rationally believe X∧¬SH.
A couple comments. First, the “evidence like ours” clause is intended to restrict
our attention to agents who get roughly the same kinds of evidence as we do – evi-
dence from their senses, their memories, and the like. What this is intended to exclude
is the logical possibility of agents who directly get X ∧¬SH as evidence. It’s hard to
imagine what getting such evidence would be like – perhaps a divine revelation that
produces veridical certainty in X ∧¬SH would qualify. But in any case, if we don’t
exclude such agents then Adequacy becomes toothless, since such agents could ratio-
nally believe X∧¬SH for any X, as long as X∧¬SH is logically coherent. (To avoid
cumbersome phrasing, I’ll sometimes leave the “evidence like ours” clause implicit in
what follows.)
Second, Adequacy entails that the correct account of classical statistical mechanics
must be one that we could rationally believe. This is a non-trivial assumption. After
all, just because we can’t rationally believe something doesn’t mean it’s false. Still,
it seems at least prima facie plausible that the correct account of classical statistical
mechanics is one that we could rationally come to believe.15
Third, assuming that the correct account of classical statistical mechanics is one
that we could rationally believe, it’s a further assumption to maintain that we could
rationally believe both it and that the Skeptical Hypothesis is false. Now, once we grant
that the correct account of statistical mechanics X is one we could rationally believe,
one could argue that this further assumption is easy to get. For, following Albert
(2000), one could maintain that the Skeptical Hypothesis undermines our evidence for
15Of course it’s somewhat awkward to talk about what the “correct” account of classical statistical me-
chanics is when we know classical statistical mechanics doesn’t actually obtain. One can see the discussion
here as in the same vein as discussions about whether the “correct” account of classical spacetime is Newto-
nian or Galilean. In all of these contexts, “correct” means something like “most attractive given the desiderata
of theory choice and some subset of our actual evidence”.
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believing something like classical statistical mechanics in the first place. So we’d only
ever be in a position to believe X if we were also in a position to believe X∧¬SH.16
Given Adequacy, one can formulate the Reversibility Objection to the initial for-
mulations of the nomic and indifference accounts as follows. Let’s understand “be-
lieve” as “having a credence of greater than 0.5 in”, and let’s use “E” to stand for any
total body of evidence like ours. Then we can reformulate Adequacy as:
Adequacy: The correct account of classical statistical mechanics X is such that one
could rationally have crE(X∧¬SH) > 0.5.
Now suppose that X = N1. As we saw above, according to N1, the chance of the
Skeptical Hypothesis being true, given that the world is in the macrostate picked out
by E is very high (i.e., chN1E(SH) ≈ 1).17 Given this, we can run the Reversibility
Objection against N1 as follows:
The Reversibility Objection (against N1):
P1. chN1E(SH) ≈ 1
P2. Bayesianism (Probabilism and Conditionalization)
P3. Chance-Credence Principle
P4. Adequacy
5. ic(SH|N1∧E) ≈ 1 (P1+P3)
6. crE(SH|N1) ≈ 1 (P2(cond)+5)
7. crE(¬SH|N1) ≈ 0 (P2(prob)+6)
8. crE(N1∧¬SH) crE(N1) (7)
9. crE(N1∧¬SH) ≈ 0 (P2(prob)+8)
10. crE(N1∧¬SH) ≯ 0.5 (9)
C. ¬N1 (P4+10)
Next suppose that X = I1. Given (5), we can run the Reversibility Objection against
I1 using an argument similar to the one we gave against N1:
16That is, suppose the Skeptical Hypothesis undermines our evidence for believing something like classi-
cal statistical mechanics, in the sense that for any account of classical statistical mechanics X, crE(X|SH) ≈ 0.
If crE(X|SH) ≈ 0, it follows that crE(X ∧ SH) crE(SH), and thus that crE(X ∧ SH) ≈ 0. And so it follows
that crE(X) = crE(X∧SH)+crE(X∧¬SH) ≈ crE(X∧¬SH). Thus if we’re granting that the correct account of
statistical mechanics X is such that we could rationally have crE(X) > 0.5, then it’s arguably not much more
of an assumption to grant that the correct account of statistical mechanics is such that we could rationally
have crE(X∧¬SH) > 0.5, since crE(X) ≈ crE(X∧¬SH).
17I’m abusing notation here slightly. Although the T and K arguments that pick out a chance distribution
are given by the conjunction of N1 and E, I am not identifying T with N1 (since T is supposed to just be a
complete chance theory, whereas N1 is a complete description of all of the laws, not just the chancy ones), or
K with E. Rather, decomposing N1 into a chancy component A and a non-chancy component B, the T and K
arguments will be T = A and K = B∧E, respectively.
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The Reversibility Objection (against I1):
P1. µ(SH|I1∧E) ≈ 1
P2. Bayesianism (Probabilism and Conditionalization)
P3. Indifference Principle
P4. Adequacy
5. ic(SH|I1∧E) ≈ 1 (P1+P3)
6. crE(SH|I1) ≈ 1 (P2(cond)+5)
7. crE(¬SH|I1) ≈ 0 (P2(prob)+6)
8. crE(I1∧¬SH) crE(I1) (7)
9. crE(I1∧¬SH) ≈ 0 (P2(prob)+8)
10. crE(I1∧¬SH) ≯ 0.5 (9)
C. ¬I1 (P4+10)
3.2 Replies to the Reversibility Objection
To escape the Reversibility Objection, we need to either reject one of the premises of
the argument, or modify the account under attack. Thus we have five ways to escape
the argument:
(i) reject P1, and dispute that N/I1 assigns a high probability to the Skeptical Hy-
pothesis,
(ii) reject P2, Bayesianism,
(iii) reject P3, either the Chance-Credence Principle (given the nomic approach) or
the Indifference Principle (given the indifference approach),
(iv) reject P4, Adequacy, or
(v) accept the conclusion, and modify one’s account so that it no longer falls prey to
the Reversibility Objection.
Option (i) is to reject P1, and dispute that chN1E(SH) ≈ 1 or that µ(A|I1∧E) ≈ 1.
For example, one might argue that while our various memories considered individually
would fail to tell against the Skeptical Hypothesis, the fact that all of them happen to
agree with each other suffices to make the Skeptical Hypothesis unlikely.18 More
generally, one might argue that when “evidence like ours” is properly understood, or
when the correct way to calculate the statistical mechanical probabilities in question is
18See Schulman (1997), p.154-155.
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properly understood, we’ll find that the chance/indifference measure of the Skeptical
Hypothesis small.19
For the most part, people have found these kinds of argument to be unpersuasive.20
And a full examination of these replies would take us too far afield. But let’s consider
a version of this kind of reply that challenges P1 by disputing what we can take to be
evidence.
I’ve been following Albert (2000) in taking our evidence E to be something like
our current memories and experiences, or the current macrostate of the world (at the
appropriate level of coarse-grained description). But one might challenge this claim.
For example, one might take our evidence to include more than what we currently
“have access to”, and so take E to consist of the sum of our memories and experiences
we’ve had throughout our life. Alternatively, one might understand “evidence like
ours” more ambitiously, so as to include things that we’ve taken science to have firmly
established, such as “the universe began 14 billion years ago in a particular low entropy
state”.21
One worry for these alternative conceptions of evidence, as we’ll see when we
discuss option (iii), is that given the skeptical worries in play regarding our memories
and records, one can’t take them to be evidence. But let’s put this worry aside for now.
A bigger worry for the more modest extensions – such as that one’s evidence is
the sum of one’s experiences throughout one’s life – is that P1 will still be true. For
when we consider events in the distant past – events before we were born – we’ll again
find that it’s overwhelmingly more likely (according to the standard measure) that our
records about the distant past coalesced from some high entropy state than that they
accurately reflect what the distant past was like. So adopting these modest extensions
won’t help us to escape P1.
The more ambitious extensions – such as taking “the universe began 14 billion
years ago in a particular low entropy state” to be evidence – will allow us to escape
P1. But given the Bayesian account we’re assuming here, these extensions are difficult
to maintain.
Few would want to maintain that a proposition like “the initial conditions of the
universe 14 billion years ago was a very low entropy one” is something we should
remain confident about, no matter what further considerations arise. For example,
we might want to lower our credence in this proposition if we found reason to think
that some kind of dynamical explanation of thermodynamic asymmetries is correct
(such as the proposal appealing to the GRW account of quantum mechanics discussed
in Albert (2000)), or if we found reason to believe that our astronomical evidence
was systematically skewed in some way, and so on. And presumably some ways of
19For example see Parker (2006), who argues that we cannot understand the content of our records in
thermodynamic terms, and that considerations involving the contents of our records will allow us to escape
the Skeptical Hypothesis.
20For example, see Albert (2000) for a reply to the kinds of considerations Schulman raises.
21Thanks to Barry Loewer here for pressing me to take this objection more seriously.
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changing one’s credence in propositions like “the initial conditions of the universe
14 billion years ago was a very low entropy one” in light of such considerations are
rational, and some are irrational. And we’d like a story about which are which.
This story is what the Bayesian apparatus is supposed to give us. But we can only
use the Bayesian apparatus to help us here if we’re not taking “the initial conditions of
the universe 14 billion years ago was very low” as a hypothesis – something which is
up for grabs – not as evidence. If we take such propositions to be evidence – something
which is settled, taken for granted, epistemological bedrock – then they’re beyond
rational evaluation.22
(Now, one might grant this and try to escape these worries by vacillating about
what one takes evidence to be – perhaps treating propositions like “the initial condi-
tions of the universe 14 billion years ago was a very low entropy one” as evidence in
some contexts, but not others, and so on. But such a position isn’t intellectually stable.
At the end of the day, we’re going have to fit everything we want to say into a single
comprehensive epistemology, a single story in which everything falls into place, where
there’s a determinate fact as to whether something is evidence or not.)
So, at the end of the day, the proponent of this more ambitious picture of evidence
will face a dilemma. They can either (a) give a comprehensive story in which things
like “the initial conditions of the universe 14 billion years ago was a very low entropy
one” do count as evidence, and give up on giving a story about what kinds of belief
changes regarding such propositions are rational, or (b) give a comprehensive story in
which things like “the initial conditions of the universe 14 billion years ago was a very
low entropy one” don’t count as evidence. The first horn of the dilemma requires one
to give up many of the epistemological ambitions of the philosophy of science, while
the second horn requires one to accept that this way of escaping P1 is untenable.
Option (ii) is to reject Bayesianism – that is, to reject Probabilism, Conditional-
ization, or both. But I take rejecting Bayesianism as a way to avoid the Reversibility
Objection to be a non-starter. Although various reasons have been offered for modi-
fying the standard Bayesian framework – in order to allow for agents with imprecise
credences, for example, or to allow for different kinds of updating with respect to cer-
tain kinds of belief – none of these modifications will help one avoid the Reversibility
22Such credal variations are straightforwardly ruled out by the Bayesian account sketched in section 2,
since Conditionalization doesn’t allow one’s credences in one’s evidence to vary – one’s credence in one’s
evidence must be (and remain) 1. But one can get around this obstacle by adopting a standard extension
of the Bayesian approach, which replaces Conditionalization with Jeffrey Conditionalization, a rule which
allows agents to get uncertain evidence. However, the move to Jeffrey Conditionalization does nothing to
address the deeper problem with taking “the initial conditions of the universe 14 billion years ago was a very
low entropy one” as evidence. For if we treat our belief changes in such propositions as due to uncertain
evidence, then they’re beyond rational evaluation – we can’t provide a story as to whether these “evidential”
changes in belief are rational or not. But surely we do want a story here – an account of what our belief in
this proposition should come to be, given certain observations and deductions about what the world is like.
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Objection.23 This eliminates option (ii).
Option (iii) is to reject either the Chance-Credence Principle (given the nomic ap-
proach) or the Indifference Principle (given the indifference approach). Rejecting the
Chance-Credence Principle is not a viable way to escape the Reversibility Objection.
Virtually everyone holds that some kind of Chance-Credence Principle constrains ra-
tional belief. And while there’s a strong case to be made in favor of the particular
formulation of the Chance-Credence Principle we’ve employed, the Reversibility Ob-
jection would still go through if we replaced it with any of the other proposed formu-
lations of the Chance-Credence Principle.24
Rejecting the Indifference Principle isn’t a promising way to escape the Reversibil-
ity Objection either. Unlike Chance-Credence Principles, Indifference Principles are
widely viewed with suspicion.25 But a proponent of the indifference approach is com-
mitted to accepting some kind of Indifference Principle, so rejecting such principles
entirely is not an option. And changing the Indifference Principle in order to try to
escape the Reversibility Objection is problematic.
One worry is that changing the Indifference Principle for this reason seems method-
ologically unsound. The Indifference Principle is supposed to be justified by a priori
considerations regarding what an ideally rational agent would believe in various evi-
dential situations. To modify the Indifference Principle in order to escape something
like the Reversibility Objection would be to modify the Indifference Principle in light
of a posteriori considerations. And since the Indifference Principle is an a priori con-
straint on rational belief, a posteriori considerations shouldn’t be relevant.
Here’s a more severe concern about modifying the Indifference Principle in order
to escape reversibility worries. Given I1 and evidence like ours, we want the Indiffer-
ence Principle to yield the right results in typical cases, and yet avoid the prescriptions
which lead to complaints like the Reversibility Objection. But it’s not clear that any
plausible a priori constraint on rational belief can do this.
Let’s look at an example. Let E be the macrostate picked out by our evidence,
where this evidence includes the fact that there’s a half-melted ice cube in a cup of
warm water, let A f be the macrostate containing the microstates in which the half-
melted ice cube is completely melted in the near future, and let Ap be the macrostate
containing the microstates in which the half-melted ice cube is completely melted in
the recent past. We want the statistical mechanical probability of A f given I1 and E
– the probability of the half-melted ice cube evolving to a completely melted state in
the near future – to be high. We also want the statistical mechanical probability of Ap
23See Levi (1985) and Joyce (2005) for discussion and references regarding imprecise credences, and Elga
(2000) and Arntzenius (2003) for some discussion and references regarding self-locating beliefs.
24For the case in favor of this formulation, see Arntzenius (1995), Meacham (2005), Nelson (2009) and
Meacham (2010); alternative formulations have been suggested by Vranas (2004), Hoefer (2007), and Ismael
(2011), among others.
25For criticisms of such principles, see van Fraassen (1989), Howson and Urbach (2005), Weisberg (2011),
and the references therein.
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given I1 and E – the probability of the half-melted ice cube having evolved from a
completely melted state in the recent past – to be low. Thus we want µ to be such that
µ(A f |I1∧E) ≈ 1 and µ(Ap|I1∧E) ≈ 0.
But these prescriptions are temporally asymmetric – future and past events are
assigned different credences. Where does this temporal asymmetry come from?
The laws I1 posits are temporally symmetric, so I1 isn’t the source of the asymme-
try. What about our evidence, E? Well, the claim that the ice cube is in a half-melted
state isn’t temporally asymmetric. And if we take our evidence to be something like
the current “time slice” of our experience, or the current macrostate of the world (at a
certain level of coarse-grained description), then the rest of our evidence isn’t tempo-
rally asymmetric either. For such evidence is synchronic, and in order to be temporally
asymmetric evidence must have temporal “breadth”.
For this reason, one might maintain that our evidence is diachronic rather than
synchronic. For instance, perhaps our evidence is something like the sum of all of the
experiences we’ve had throughout our life. And this diachronic evidence is temporally
asymmetric.
In some ways, this is a tricky position to maintain. Evidence, in the relevant sense
– the notion of “evidence” that appears in Conditionalization – is something you ought
to have a credence of 1 in, something you ought to be virtually certain of. And given
the skeptical worries in play regarding our memories and our records of the past, our
memories and past experiences are not something we can take to be evidence in this
sense.
But, more importantly, these kinds of attempts to extend the notion of evidence run
into the problems we saw earlier in the discussion of option (i). The modest extensions,
like the one just described above will provide us with temporally asymmetric evidence,
but this asymmetry seems unlikely to yield the dramatic asymmetry in prescriptions
that we want. The ambitious extensions (which take things like “‘the initial conditions
of the universe 14 billion years ago was a very low entropy one” to be evidence), on the
other hand, will give us temporally asymmetric evidence which yields the asymmetric
prescriptions we desire, but as we’ve already seen, these accounts of evidence are
problematic.
So neither I1 nor E can yield the temporal asymmetry we want with respect to
our assignments to A f and Ap. Thus the temporal asymmetry must come from the
indifference measure itself. But it’s hard to see how any kind of a priori consideration
could justify treating one direction in time differently from the other. Certainly, none
of the standard considerations appealed to in order to justify Indifference Principles
– symmetry, parsimony, information-theoretic considerations, etc. – provide grounds
for such an asymmetry.
Together, these considerations tell against option (iii). What about option (iv),
rejecting Adequacy? The role of Adequacy in the argument is to move us from the
uncomfortable result that one can’t rationally both believe the proposed account of
statistical mechanics and reject the Skeptical Hypothesis, to the conclusion that the
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proposed account of statistical mechanics is not correct. To reject Adequacy and ac-
cept the rest of the argument is to concede the uncomfortable result, but hold on to the
proposed account of statistical mechanics anyway. While this technically allows one
to escape the Reversibility Objection, it’s not very satisfying. Certainly, this seems
like a lonely position, since not many people are going to be comfortable embracing
the skeptical consequences of the account and calling it a day.
This leaves us with option (v): modifying the account under attack, N/I1. Given
that we’re going to change N/I1, what parts of the account should we change? There
are three options: (v.a) we can change what it takes the laws to be, (v.b) we can change
what it takes the statistical mechanical probabilities to be, or (v.c) we can add some
further claim to the account which does neither of the above. Let’s consider these
options in reverse order.
The third way of modifying an account, (v.c) – adding a claim to the account
that’s doesn’t change the laws or the statistical mechanical probabilities – won’t help
us escape the Reversibility Objection. Let A be the claim we’re adding to the ac-
count, and let our new account, the conjunction of A and N/I1, be N/IA1. Since N/IA1
logically entails N/I1, if follows from the probability axioms that crE(N/I1∧¬SH) ≥
crE(N/IA1∧¬SH). Thus if we’re rationally required to be such that crE(N/I1∧¬SH)≈
0, we’re also rationally required to be such that crE(N/IA1∧¬SH) ≈ 0. So the Re-
versibility Objection will apply to N/IA1 as well.
The second way of modifying an account, (v.b) – changing the statistical mechan-
ical probabilities – ends up collapsing into one of the other options. The Reversibility
Objection arises due to the constraints on rational belief that the account imposes. So
to escape the Reversibility Objection, we need to change the values the account as-
signs that constrain rational belief, be they the chances (on the nomic approach) or the
indifference measures (on the indifference approach). Changing the chances requires
changing the laws that assign the chances, so modifying the nomic account in the sec-
ond way (v.b) amounts to a special case of changing the account in the first way (v.a).
And changing the indifference measure is to modify the Indifference Principle, which
(on the indifference approach) is just option (iii).
This leaves us with the first way of modifying an account, (v.a) – changing the
laws. Unlike the other options, this option seems viable. Suppose we modify N/I1
by adding a lawful constraint that allows all and only initial conditions that belong to
some particular low-entropy macrostate. That is, suppose we modify N/I1 by adding
the Past Hypothesis to the laws. Then we get a new account, N/I2. And N/I2 is immune
to the Reversibility Objection.
The Reversibility Objection doesn’t apply to N2 because it isn’t the case that
chN2E(SH) ≈ 1. The nomic accounts of classical statistical mechanics employ a Statis-
tical Postulate that assigns chances to the lawfully-permitted initial conditions that are
proportional to the Liouville measure. And if the account includes a Past Hypothesis,
as N2 does, then most of the microstates in our initial account are not lawfully permit-
ted – the laws forbid any microstate which, when evolved backwards according to the
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dynamics, doesn’t lead to the particular low-entropy initial condition required by the
Past Hypothesis. Once we rule out these possibilities and renormalize, we find that the
majority of the remaining microstates compatible with our evidence do line up with
our memories and records of what the past was like, contra the Skeptical Hypothesis.
Thus chN2E(SH) ≈ 0.26
The Reversibility Objection doesn’t apply to I2 because it isn’t the case that µ(SH|I2∧
E) ≈ 1. It follows from (6) that µ(A|I2∧E) = chN2E(A). And since chN2E(SH) ≈ 0, it
follows that µ(SH|I2∧E) ≈ 0 as well.
So by adopting a Past Hypothesis, and replacing N/I1 with N/I2, we can escape
the Reversibility Objection.
There has been some debate over whether one should understand the Past Hypoth-
esis as a law, or as (say) a contingent generalization.27 Now that we’ve given a precise
characterization of the Reversibility Objection, we can see that regardless of whether
we adopt the nomic approach or the indifference approach, the Past Hypothesis has to
be a law in order to address the Reversibility Objection. For if the Past Hypothesis is
only a contingent generalization, then adding it to one’s account amounts to adopting
option (v.c), not (v.a). And, as we’ve seen, adopting option (v.c) doesn’t help us escape
the Reversibility Objection.28
4 The Meta-Reversibility Objection
Adopting the Past Hypothesis addresses the Reversibility Objection as posed. But one
might wonder whether we can raise the problem in another way.
Here is one way to see why N/I1 is susceptible to the Reversibility Objection.
Conditional on a particular low-entropy initial condition obtaining, N/I1 assigns the
right values to past events. But conditional on some high-entropy initial condition ob-
taining, N/I1 assigns the wrong values to past events. And since N/I1 unconditionally
assigns a much higher value to high-entropy initial conditions than to low-entropy ini-
tial conditions, the assignments given high-entropy initial conditions will swamp those
given low-entropy initial conditions. Thus, when all is said and done, N/I1 assigns the
26For a more detailed description of this argument, see Albert (2000). Although the claim that the Past
Hypothesis allows us to get around the Reversibility Objection is wide-spread, it is at least mildly contentious.
For some worries regarding this claim, see Uffink (2002), Winsberg (2004a), Winsberg (2004b), Parker
(2005), Earman (2006) and Callender (2008).
27See Callender (2004) and North (2011) for discussion and references.
28Here’s another way to see why this is so. Call the contingent version of the Past Hypothesis “PHc”,
and call the account we get by adding a contingent Past Hypothesis to N/I1, “N/I1c”. A little thought shows
that crE(N/I1c) = crE(N/I1∧PHc) ≈ crE(N/I1∧¬SH). Thus, since we’re rationally required to not believe
N/I1∧¬SH, we’re rationally required to not believe N/I1c.
What makes N/I1c seem like it might help with the Reversibility Objection is the observation that, unlike
N/I1, believing N/I1c doesn’t commit you to believing the Skeptical Hypothesis. This is true. But since we’re
already committed to not believing N/I1c, this doesn’t help us satisfy Adequacy.
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wrong values to past events.
Now, as we saw in the previous section, we can fix this by lawfully requiring the
low-entropy initial condition to obtain – that is, by adding the Past Hypothesis (PH)
to the laws. If we do that, then the resulting account, N/I2, ends up assigning the right
values to past events.
At this point, however, one could raise a different reversibility worry. To begin,
note that there are other lawful constraints on initial conditions one could impose. For
example, one could lawfully require that some high-entropy initial condition obtain;
call this the Past Hypothesis∗ (PH∗). If we do that, then the resulting account, call it
N/I2∗, ends up assigning the wrong values to past events.
Now suppose we’re rationally required to have credences over lawfully required
initial conditions that mirror our credences over contingently obtaining initial condi-
tions, so that we assign a much higher unconditional credence to lawful high-entropy
initial conditions like PH∗ than to lawful low-entropy initial conditions like PH. Then,
since we’ll unconditionally assign a much higher credence to the account that employs
PH∗ (N/I2∗) than to the account that employs PH (N/I2), the credences assigned by
N/I2∗ will swamp those assigned by N/I2. So, when all is said and done, we’ll be re-
quired to adopt the wrong credences about past events. Call the worry that an account
will commit one to this result the Meta-Reversibility Objection.
The Meta-Reversibility Objection shouldn’t worry proponents of nomic accounts.
The objection only gets traction if one’s account requires one to assign credences
over lawful constraints on initial conditions in a certain way. And nomic accounts
don’t impose any requirements on how one assigns credences over lawful constraints
on initial conditions. Nomic accounts require only that one’s credences line up with
the chances. And there aren’t any chances over different lawful constraints on initial
conditions. After all, the Statistical Postulate won’t give us chances until we know
what the lawful constraints on initial conditions (if any) are!
Indeed, the proponent of nomic accounts is perfectly free to assign, in good con-
science, a high initial credence to N2 and a low initial credence to N2∗. This may not
be egalitarian, but so what? We’ve known that we need to do something like this in
order to ground our inductive biases since Goodman’s (1954) famous grue cases. If
we want to end up believing the world is like we think it is, our initial credences will
have to be biased towards the theories we actually believe in certain ways.
But the Meta-Reversibility Objection is a worry for proponents of indifference
accounts. For the Indifference Principle makes prescriptions about everything. Thus
it makes prescriptions about lawful constraints on initial conditions.29 And there is
substantial pressure on the proponent of the indifference approach to maintain that I2*
29One might wonder whether one could resist this worry by simply adopting a weaker Indifference Prin-
ciple, which only makes prescriptions in some limited range of domains. As we’ll see, this isn’t a promising
option. The typical rationales used to justify the Indifference Principle’s prescriptions in these limited do-
mains will apply just as well to wider domains. And, as we’ll discuss in section 4.2, imposing arbitrary
constraints on these rationales would be fatal to the Indifference Principle project.
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should be assigned a much higher credence than I2.
I’ll discuss this more in section 4.2, but briefly, the worry is this. In order to yield
the expected prescriptions given I1, the indifference measure must assign values to
initial conditions that are proportional to the Liouville measure. But if this is how
we ought to be indifferent with respect to which initial conditions contingently ob-
tain, it’s hard to see why we shouldn’t be indifferent in the same way with respect to
which initial conditions lawfully obtain. After all, the structure of our ignorance over
the lawfully required initial conditions mirrors the structure of our ignorance over the
contingent initial conditions. And the standard rationales offered to justify indiffer-
ence measures – symmetry considerations, information-theoretic considerations, etc.
– apply equally well to both cases. If this is right, then the Indifference Principle will
prescribe a much higher credence to I2* than I2. So the Meta-Reversibility Objection
poses a real threat to indifference accounts.
4.1 Formalizing the Meta-Reversibility Objection
Let’s formulate the Meta-Reversibility Objection more precisely. To begin, let’s spell
out the motivating worry a bit more carefully.
Let I2− be the proposition that the correct account of classical statistical mechanics
is some modified version of I1 which adds a lawful constraint on boundary conditions.
Thus I2 is equivalent to I2−∧PH, and I2∗ is equivalent to I2−∧PH∗. Let PHc be the
contingent version of the Past Hypothesis – i.e., the claim that, as a matter of contin-
gent fact, the initial conditions came from some particular low-entropy macrostate –
and let PH∗c be the contingent version of the Past Hypothesis∗.
The worry sketched above is that the Indifference Principle will require one to
assign credences to PH and PH∗ given I2− and E that mirror those it requires one to
assign to PHc and PH∗c given I1 and E. That is, the worry is that if the indifference
measure is such that:
µ(PHc|I1∧E) µ(PH∗c |I1∧E), (7)
it will also be such that:
µ(PH|I2−∧E) µ(PH∗|I2−∧E). (8)
And this entails that, given evidence like ours E, our credence in I2∗ should be much
larger than our credence in I2.30
This puts us in an unhappy situation. If our credence in I2∗ is much larger than
our credence in I2, then we can’t rationally believe that I2 obtains. Thus I2 can’t
satisfy Adequacy. Of course, we may be able to rationally believe something like
30We have µ(PH|I2− ∧ E)  µ(PH∗|I2− ∧ E). Multiplying both sides by µ(I2− ∧ E) gives us µ(PH∧
I2− ∧ E) µ(PH∗ ∧ I2− ∧ E), or, equivalently, µ(I2∧ E) µ(I2∗ ∧ E). Dividing both sides by µ(E) gives
us µ(I2|E) µ(I2∗|E). Then applying the Indifference Principle gives us ic(I2|E) ic(I2∗|E), and applying
Conditionalization gives us crE(I2) crE(I2∗).
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I2∗. But I2∗ is subject to the original Reversibility Objection – since almost all of the
microstates compatible with our evidence and the Past Hypothesis∗ are ones which
fail to line up with our memories and records of the past, our credence in I2∗ ∧¬SH
will be very low. Thus I2∗ won’t satisfy Adequacy either. Either way, it looks like the
indifference accounts of classical statistical mechanics fail to satisfy Adequacy. They
are either susceptible to the Reversibility Objection described in section 3, or they are
susceptible to the worry just described above – the Meta-Reversibility Objection.
Here’s another way to think about these concerns. Proponents of the indifference
approach face a choice between whether or not to take there to be lawful constraints
on boundary conditions; i.e., a choice between accepting I1 (which entails that there
are no lawful constraints on boundary conditions) or I2− (which entails that there are).
If they accept I1 then they’re rationally required to believe the Skeptical Hypothesis –
that their memories and records about the past are false. If they accept I2−, then they’re
also rationally required to believe the Skeptical Hypothesis. For although they’ll be-
lieve that if I2 is true then it’s likely that their memories and records about the past
are reliable, their credence in I2 will be so low compared to its competitors that this
will have little impact on their overall credence. The laws that will dominate their
credence will be the high entropy initial condition ones like I2∗, which predict that it’s
much more likely that we coalesced from a high entropy state than that we evolved
from a low entropy state. So, when all is said and done, they’ll again be rationally
required to believe the Skeptical Hypothesis.
Here is a formal characterization of the argument. Given (8), we can set up the
Meta-Reversibility Objection against I2 as follows:
The Meta-Reversibility Objection (against I2):
P1. µ(PH|I2−∧E) µ(PH∗|I2−∧E)
P2. Bayesianism (Probabilism and Conditionalization)
P3. Indifference Principle
P4. Adequacy
5. ic(PH|I2−∧E) ic(PH∗|I2−∧E) (P1+P3)
6. crE(PH|I2−) crE(PH∗|I2−) (P2(cond)+5)
7. crE(PH∧ I2−) crE(PH∗∧ I2−) (P2(prob)+6)
8. crE(I2) crE(I2*) (7)
9. crE(I2) ≈ 0 (P2(prob)+8)
10. crE(I2∧¬SH) ≈ 0 (P2(prob)+9)
11. crE(I2∧¬SH) ≯ 0.5 (10)
C. ¬I2 (P4+11)
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This gives us the Meta-Reversibility Objection against I2. What happens if we try
to run the Meta-Reversibility Objection against N2?
To run the argument against N2, we would have to replace P1 with chN2−E(PH)
chN2−E(PH∗), replace P3 with the Chance-Credence Principle, and replace “I2” and
“I2−” with “N2” and “N2−” throughout (where N2− is the nomic analog of I2− – the
proposition that the correct account of classical statistical mechanics is some modified
version of N1 which adds a lawful constraint on boundary conditions). But this argu-
ment won’t work, because this version of P1 is false. P1 is false because N2− and E
don’t suffice to pick out a chance distribution. It’s true that N2− includes the Statistical
Postulate, and the Statistical Postulate posits chances. But what chances the Statistical
Postulate assigns depend on what lawful constraints there are on the boundary condi-
tions, and N2− and E don’t tell us what these lawful constraints are. So the ch terms
on both sides of P1’s inequality will be undefined, and P1 will be false.
4.2 Replies to the Meta-Reversibility Objection
As with the Reversibility Objection, we can divide the potential replies to the Meta-
Reversibility Objection into five options:
(i) reject P1, that µ(PH|I2−∧E) µ(PH∗|I2−∧E),
(ii) reject P2, Bayesianism,
(iii) reject P3, the Indifference Principle,
(iv) reject P4, Adequacy, or
(v) accept the conclusion, and modify one’s account so that it no longer falls prey to
the Meta-Reversibility Objection.
One can try to do this by either: (v.a) changing the laws the account specifies,
(v.b) changing the statistical mechanical probabilities the account assigns, or
(v.c) adding some further claim to the account that does neither of the above.
The first option is to reject P1, and dispute that µ(PH|I2−∧E) µ(PH∗|I2−∧E).
As before, one way to do this is argue that when “evidence like ours” is properly un-
derstood, or when the correct way to calculate the probabilities in question is properly
understood, we’ll find that P1 is false. But if this kind of reply fails in the context of
the Reversibility Objection, as we’re assuming, it seems it will fail here as well. So
this way of rejecting P1 does not look promising.
There’s another way to reject P1 here that wasn’t available against the Reversibility
Objection. Namely, one can reject P1 by arguing that this result comes from using the
wrong Indifference Principle.31 Given this way of pursuing option (i), options (i),
(iii) and (v.b) are all versions of a single reply – they’re all ways of rejecting the
31This way of rejecting P1 was not available to opponents of the Reversibility Objection because the
value I1 assigns to the relevant proposition (the value of SH given I1∧E) is fixed. We stipulated that I1
assigns values that line up with N1’s chances, so the value of SH given I1∧E must be equal to the chance of
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Indifference Principle the argument employs, and replacing it with a principle that
makes different prescriptions. This is the most natural reply to the Meta-Reversibility
Objection. For the argument hangs on the claim that, given I2− and E, the indifference
measure of PH∗ is much greater than that of PH. And, one might say, it’s not obvious
why the proponent of the indifference approach should accept this claim.
But this claim turns out to be hard for proponents of the indifference approach to
reject.32 One reason is that they presumably want the Indifference Principle to still
yield the standard probability assignments given accounts like I1 and I2. That is, they
want the indifference measure to be such that:
µ(PHc|I1∧E) µ(PH∗c |I1∧E). (9)
But if the indifference measure assigns those values, it’s hard to see why it won’t assign
similar values to the lawful versions of the Past Hypothesis and the Past Hypothesis*
given I2−:
µ(PH|I2−∧E) µ(PH∗|I2−∧E). (10)
After all, the two cases are structurally analogous. In one case we’re assessing what
the initial macrostate of the world is, as a matter of contingent fact, while in the other
we’re assessing what the initial macrostate of the world is, as a matter of lawful fact.
In all other respects the two cases are the same. And all of the standard considerations
that are appealed to in order to justify indifference measures – symmetry, parsimony,
informational entropy, and so on – apply in the same way to both cases.
To get a feel for why this is so, let’s go through an example in detail. The most
popular version of the indifference approach to statistical mechanics, suggested by
Jaynes (1983), maintains that the indifference measure of a macrostate should track
how uninformative it is to be told that the system is in that macrostate, so that more
informative macrostates get smaller indifference measures. And Jaynes proposes that
we cash out the relevant notion of informativeness here by appealing to the notion of
Shannon entropy, i.e., information entropy.
Here’s one way to flesh out the details of such a proposal in a Boltzmannian frame-
work.
SH given N1∧E. And the chance of SH given N1∧E is fixed by our stipulation that the chances given N1 be
proportional to the Liouville measure.
By contrast, this way of rejecting P1 is available to opponents of the Meta-Reversibility Objection because
the values I2− assigns to the relevant propositions (the values of PH and PH∗ given I2−∧E) are not fixed.
It’s true that the “matching values” stipulation we made in section 2.2 implies that the values of PH and PH∗
given I2−∧E should line up with the chances of PH and PH∗ given N2−∧E, if there are such chances. But,
as we just saw in section 4.1, there are no such chances – the chances of PH and PH∗ given N2−∧E are not
well-defined.
32As we saw in section 3.2, there are also concerns regarding whether this way of replying to reversibility
worries is methodologically sound, since reversibility worries seem a posteriori, while the Indifference Prin-
ciple is supposed to be an a priori constraint. But, these worries are of secondary interest relative to the main
concerns I discuss in the text, so I’ll put them aside.
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Shannon Entropy Indifference:
The Shannon Entropy S of a random variable R is:
S (R) = −
∑
i
p(Ri) · ln p(Ri), (11)
where p(Ri) is the probability of R yielding the ith possible outcome. Since a
macrostate is not a random variable, we cannot apply S to a macrostate A di-
rectly. Instead, we need to find some way to construct a canonical random vari-
able associated with A. Then we can take the Shannon entropy of that random
variable to be the Shannon entropy associated with A.
Let a ∆x∆v-partition, γ, be a partition of phase space into hypercubes which uni-
formly have sides of dimension ∆x (for the spatial dimensions) and ∆v (for the
velocity dimensions), in standard units. Call these hypercubes the γ-macrostates.
Consider some macrostate A, and some ∆x∆v-partition, γ, that is fine-grained
enough so that we can characterize A as a disjunction of γ-macrostates. Let
“γA” be the random variable that has an equal probability of yielding each of
the γ-macrostates that compose A.
Let the Shannon entropy associated with A (with respect to γ) be the Shannon
entropy of γA. So if A can be characterized as a disjunction of n γ-macrostates,
the Shannon entropy associated with A (with respect to γ) will be:
S (γA) = −
∑
i
p(γAi) · ln p(γAi) = n · −1n · ln
1
n
= − ln 1
n
. (12)
Given this, we can impose the desired constraint on µ as follows:
µ-Constraint: Let L be some (possibly incomplete) description of the laws,
which includes the dynamics, and is such that the phase space associated
with a system can be given a ∆x∆v-partition. Let A and B be arbitrary
macrostates in this phase space. Finally, for any macrostate X, let XL be
the macrostate composed of the microstates compatible with X and the law-
ful constraints on boundary conditions imposed by L, if any. Then for any
∆x∆v-partition, γ, such that AL and ABL can be characterized as disjunc-
tions of γ-macrostates, µ must be such that:
µ(A|B∧L) ∝ e
S (γABL)
eS (γBL)
. (13)
A couple comments. First, note that while the values we get for eS (γABL) and
eS (γBL) depend on our choice of γ, the ratio between eS (γABL) and eS (γBL) do
not. So this constraint does not depend on our choice of γ. Second, note that
eS (γA) = e−ln(1/n) = 1eln(1/n) =
1
1/n = n. So for any given γ, the indifference measure
of a macrostate is proportional to the number of γ-macrostates it’s composed of.
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Third, note that for any γ, each γ-macrostate has the same Liouville measure.
So for any given γ, the Liouville measure of a macrostate A is proportional to
the number of γ-macrostates it’s composed of. Thus this constraint requires the
indifference measure to be proportional to the Liouville measure. Fourth, this
constraint is incomplete, since it does not fully specify µ. A complete version of
this constraint would also tell us how to apply information-theoretic considera-
tions to determine how to be indifferent about everything, and would yield the
above constraint as a special case.
This constraint on µ yields the values we want given L = I1 and L = I2. But it also
yields the values that make P1 of the Meta-Reversibility Objection true given L = I2−.
And this is what we should expect given a Shannon entropy approach to indifference.
The Shannon entropy of a macrostate A can be seen as a measure of how much more
information you need, after being told that a system’s in macrostate A, to know what
the system’s microstate is.33 And the only thing relevant to that is the size of the
macrostate. The bigger the macrostate, the bigger the range of microstates it contains,
and the more you have to say to pick out a particular microstate. The smaller the
macrostate, the smaller the range of microstates it contains, and the less you have to say
to pick out a particular microstate. But these information considerations are the same
regardless of whether we’re assigning credence to the initial conditions contingently
being in macrostate A, or assigning credence to the initial conditions lawfully being
in macrostate A. The only thing that matters, information-wise, is the size of the
macrostate A. Whether A obtains contingently or lawfully is irrelevant.
Here is a related concern for trying to escape reversibility worries by modifying
the Indifference Principle. Given I2 and evidence like ours, we want the Indifference
Principle to yield the desired prescriptions in typical cases, and yet avoid the prescrip-
tions which lead to complaints like the Meta-Reversibility Objection. But it’s not clear
that any plausible a priori constraint on rational belief can do this.34
33Or, if we divide up A into a number of small macrostates, a measure of how much more information you
need to know a system’s small macrostate after being told that it’s in A.
34I raise the temporal asymmetry worry as a general worry for attempts to avoid the Meta-Reversibility
Objection by modifying the Indifference Principle. But one can also use temporal symmetry considerations
to argue directly for P1.
To make things manageable, let’s assume that the only possible lawful constraints on boundary conditions
are pairings of one of three constraints on initial conditions (the Past Hypothesis, the Past Hypothesis∗, and
the Past Hypothesis−, which imposes a vacuous constraint on initial conditions), and one of three constraints
on final conditions (the Future Hypothesis (FH), which requires the world to end in a particular low-entropy
state, the Future Hypothesis∗ (FH∗), which requires the world to end in some particular high-entropy state,
and the Future Hypothesis− (FH−), which imposes a vacuous constraint on final conditions).
Now further assume that: (1) our evidence E is temporally symmetric, (2) the indifference measure is
temporally symmetric, (3) given the lawful constraints on boundary conditions, the measure assigns values
proportional to the Liouville measure, (4) the measure prescribes the desired values to future events given I2−
and E, and (5) the measure assigns a small value to PH− given I2− and E (which, given (3), is a necessary
condition in order for the measure to yield the right prescriptions regarding past events, given I2− and E).
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Consider again the example of the half-melted ice cube in warm water, from sec-
tion 3.2. Given that our evidence (E) includes that there is a half-melted ice cube in
warm water, we want our credence that it will be fully melted in the near future (A f )
given I2 and E to be high, and our credence that it was fully melted in the recent past
(Ap) given I2 and E to be low. Thus we want µ to be such that µ(A f |I2∧E) ≈ 1 and
µ(Ap|I2∧E) ≈ 0. And if we’re proponents of I2, we would like it to be permissible to
both be confident in I2, and to have the appropriate credences in propositions like A f
and Ap given E. Since I2 entails I2−, this won’t be permissible unless µ is such that
µ(A f |I2−∧E) ≈ 1 and µ(Ap|I2−∧E) ≈ 0.35
These prescriptions are temporally asymmetric. What is the source of this asym-
metry?
The laws I2− posits are temporally symmetric. It’s true that I2− also entails that
there are lawful constraints on boundary conditions, and many of the possible lawful
constraints are temporally asymmetric. And conditional on some such asymmetric
constraint, µ will presumably make asymmetric prescriptions. But for each temporally
asymmetric constraint, there is a constraint that is its temporal inverse. And without
a bias in µ that favors some asymmetric constraints over their temporal inverses, the
weighted average of these contributions to µ conditional on I2− cancel out. So I2− is
not the culprit.
What about our evidence E? E cannot be the culprit either, for as we saw in
section 3.2, our evidence does not suffice to ground the desired asymmetry of our
prescriptions.
So the temporal asymmetry must come from the indifference measure itself, either
from temporally biased assignments over the different lawful constraints on boundary
conditions, or temporally biased assignments given lawful constraints on boundary
conditions, or both. But it’s hard to believe that any kind of a priori constraint on
rational belief could yield this kind of temporal asymmetry. Any reasons we could
come to have for believing the world is temporally asymmetric would seem to be
purely a posteriori.
Then one can argue for P1 as follows:
L1. (3) and (4) entail that the measure must assign a high value to FH∗∨FH−, and a low value to FH, given
E and I2−.
L2. Since E, I2- and the measure are all temporally symmetric (from (1) and (2)), it follows from L1 that the
measure must assign a high value to PH∗∨PH−, and a low value to PH, given E and I2−.
L3. L2 and (5) entail that the measure must assign a high value to PH∗, and a low value to PH−∨PH, given
E and I2−.
C. Thus (from L3) the measure must assign a greater value to PH∗ than to PH, given E and I2−.
35Since I2 entails I2−, crE(I2−) ≥ crE(I2). So if we’re confident in I2 (e.g., crE(I2) ≈ 1), it follows that
we’re confident in I2− (e.g., crE(I2−) ≈ 1). Thus 1 ≈ µ(A f |I2∧ E) ≈ µ(A f |E) ≈ µ(A f |I2− ∧ E); likewise,
0 ≈ µ(Ap|I2∧E) ≈ µ(Ap|E) ≈ µ(Ap|I2−∧E).
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It’s worth taking a step back to say a bit more about the dialectical status of these
problems. The characterization of the Indifference Principle we gave in section 2.1
imposed few substantive constraints on what the principle was like. So it’s logically
possible to adopt an Indifference Principle that yields pretty much any prescriptions
one wants. One could, for example, adopt an Indifference Principle that only makes
prescriptions regarding how to assign values to initial macrostates that might contin-
gently obtain. Or one could adopt an Indifference Principle that employs information-
theoretic considerations to assign values to the initial macrostates that might contin-
gently obtain, but employs entirely different considerations to assign values to the
initial macrostates that might be lawfully required. More generally, one could sim-
ply jerry-rig an indifference measure so that it yields the desired statistical mechanical
probabilities given I1 and I2, and doesn’t yield the problematic assignments that lead
to the Meta-Reversibility Objection.
But the mere logical possibility of such a response is cold comfort. The Indif-
ference Principle is supposed to be an a priori constraint on rational belief. For it to
be credible that such a principle is correct, one needs to make a convincing case that
a priori plausibility considerations will pick out this particular constraint on rational
belief. And it had better not be the case that one can provide a plausible rationale for
any logically possible set of prescriptions. For if one could, then the entire project of
justifying one Indifference Principle over the others would be a non-starter.
So insofar as one is on board with the project of finding the right Indifference
Principle, one can’t just choose whatever principle gets one out of trouble, and expect
to be able to provide a plausible rationale for it. Rather, one has to try to determine
what the plausible constraints on rational belief are, and hope that these considerations
deliver an Indifference Principle which avoids the problematic results. And what the
discussion above suggests is that if we employ the kinds of considerations people have
so far used to justify Indifference Principles – symmetry, Shannon entropy, etc. – and
we accept the constraints that they impose on rational belief – e.g., temporal symmetry
– then we won’t able to do this.
So proponents of I2 can, if they like, see this as a challenge: provide a plausible
a priori rationale for the Indifference Principle they want to use to recover statistical
mechanical probabilities, and demonstrate that these same considerations don’t lead
to the Meta-Reversibility Objection.
Thus options (i), (iii) and (v.b) – i.e., modifying the Indifference Principle – look
like unpromising ways to escape the Meta-Reversibility Objection. What about the
other options?
I take option (ii), rejecting Bayesianism, to be untenable, for the same reasons as
before. While there may be compelling reasons to modify the Bayesian framework,
these changes to the Bayesian framework won’t help the proponent of the indifference
approach escape the Meta-Reversibility Objection.
Likewise, option (iv), rejecting Adequacy, is unsatisfying for the same reasons as
before. To reject Adequacy and accept the rest of the argument is to just accept the
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uncomfortable consequences the account is alleged to have, and then bite the bullet
and hold on to the account anyway.
And again, option (v.c), conjoining some further claims to the account, won’t help
us escape the argument. Since I2 fails to satisfy Adequacy, any account that logically
entails I2 – such as the conjunction of I2 and some further claim A – will fail to satisfy
Adequacy as well.
This leaves us with (v.a): changing the laws I2 posits. This option provided a
promising reply to the Reversibility Objection. But in this case, it’s not clear how
changing the laws can help. Since we’re restricting our attention to accounts of clas-
sical statistical mechanics, we’re holding the dynamics fixed. So if we want to change
I2’s laws, it seems we need to reject or modify the lawful constraints it imposes on
boundary conditions.36
But here the proponent of the indifference approach faces a dilemma. For accounts
that impose lawful constraints on boundary conditions that get assigned a high value
by the standard Indifference Principles, like I2∗, assign high values to the Skeptical
Hypothesis, and so don’t satisfy Adequacy. And accounts that assign low values to the
Skeptical Hypothesis, like I2, impose lawful constraints on boundary conditions that
get assigned a low value by the standard Indifference Principles, and so don’t satisfy
Adequacy. So whichever way one goes, it looks like the resulting account won’t satisfy
Adequacy.
5 Conclusion
The initial formulations of the nomic and indifference accounts are subject to the Re-
versibility Objection. And proponents of both approaches can escape the Reversibility
Objection by modifying their accounts to include the Past Hypothesis. But this move
doesn’t free the indifference approach of reversibility worries. For by adopting the Past
Hypothesis to escape one reversibility worry, indifference accounts become subject
to another – the Meta-Reversibility Objection. And modifying indifference accounts
again in order to avoid this objection leads us back to accounts that are susceptible
to the Reversibility Objection. So, taken together, the Reversibility Objection and the
Meta-Reversibility Objection pose a steep challenge to the viability of the indifference
approach.37
36One could also keep all of the laws I2 posits and add some further laws as well. (This move doesn’t run
into the same worry as (ii.c) because it doesn’t just conjoin something to I2, it contradicts I2. I2 asserts that
the complete laws are given by classical mechanics and the Past Hypothesis, while this alternative account
would not.) But given that the dynamics are deterministic, there’s only room for laws that either (i) pose
lawful constraints on the boundary conditions or (ii) pose chancy constraints on the boundary conditions.
The former is the case being considered in the text, and the latter moves us out of the realm of indifference
approaches.
37I’d like to thank Phil Bricker, Maya Eddon, Nina Emery, Barry Loewer and Travis Norsen for comments
and discussion.
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Appendix
In the text I make the simplifying assumption that the phase space we’re working with
has been fixed. Here is how the central principles and arguments go if we relax that
assumption.
Let P stand for the parameters needed to pick out a particular phase space, given
the laws. Once we explicitly take P into account, the chances described in the text
will now all include P as a subscript; e.g., chN1E(SH) will become chN1PE(SH). Like-
wise all the Indifference Principles discussed in the text will all need to take P into
consideration. Thus part (b) of indifference accounts I1 and I2 will read:
(b) The statistical mechanical probability of A given B is what the Indifference Prin-
ciple assigns as the rational initial credence in A conditional on the macrostate
B, the parameters needed pick out the phase space P, and the laws.
And the desired constraint on µ will be:
µ-Constraint: Let L be some (possibly incomplete) description of the laws, which
includes the dynamics, and is such that the phase space associated with a system
can be given a ∆x∆v-partition. Let P be a specification of the further parameters
needed to pick out a phase space. Let A and B be arbitrary macrostates in this
phase space. Let AL (ABL) be the macrostates composed of the microstates
compatible with A (A and B) and the lawful constraints on boundary conditions
imposed by L, if any. Then for any ∆x∆v-partition, γ, such that AL and ABL can
be characterized as disjunctions of γ-macrostates, µ must be such that:
µ(A|B∧P∧L) ∝ e
S (γABL)
eS (γBL)
. (14)
Let’s turn to the Reversibility Objection and Meta-Reversibility Objection. Let ∀c
be the restricted quantifier that ranges over all and only the Ps that are compatible with
our evidence. To simplify things, I’ll assume that these Ps are finite in number. Then
we can run the Reversibility Objection against N1 as follows:
The Reversibility Objection (against N1):
P1. ∀cP chN1PE(SH) ≈ 1
P2. Bayesianism (Probabilism and Conditionalization)
P3. Chance-Credence Principle
P4. Adequacy
5. ∀cP ic(SH|N1∧P∧E) ≈ 1 (P1+P3)
6. ∀cP crE(SH|N1∧P) ≈ 1 (P2(cond)+5)
7. ∀cP crE(¬SH|N1∧P) ≈ 0 (P2(prob)+6)
8. ∀cP crE(N1∧P∧¬SH) crE(N1∧P) (7)
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9.
∑
∀cP crE(N1∧P∧¬SH)
∑
∀cP crE(N1∧P) (8)
10.
∑
∀P crE(N1∧P∧¬SH)∑∀P crE(N1∧P) (P2(prob)+9)
11. crE(N1∧¬SH) crE(N1) (P2(prob)+10)
12. crE(N1∧¬SH) ≈ 0 (P2(prob)+11)
13. crE(N1∧¬SH) ≯ 0.5 (12)
C. ¬N1 (P4+13)
The Reversibility Objection against I1 will be similar; we just replace P1 with
∀cP µ(SH|I1∧ P∧ E) ≈ 1, replace P3 with the Indifference Principle, and substitute
“I1” for “N1” throughout.
Finally, the Meta-Reversibility Objection against I2 will be:
The Meta-Reversibility Objection (against I2):
P1. ∀cP µ(PH|I2−∧P∧E) µ(PH∗|I2−∧P∧E)
P2. Bayesianism (Probabilism and Conditionalization)
P3. Indifference Principle
P4. Adequacy
5. ∀cP ic(PH|I2−∧P∧E) ic(PH∗|I2−∧P∧E) (P1+P3)
6. ∀cP crE(PH|I2−∧P) crE(PH∗|I2−∧P) (P2(cond)+5)
7. ∀cP crE(PH∧ I2−∧P) crE(PH∗∧ I2−∧P) (P2(prob)+6)
8. ∀cP crE(I2∧P) crE(I2*∧P) (7)
9.
∑
∀cP crE(I2∧P)
∑
∀cP crE(I2*∧P) (8)
10.
∑
P crE(I2∧P)∑P crE(I2*∧P) (P2(prob)+9)
11. crE(I2) crE(I2*) (P2(prob)+10)
12. crE(I2) ≈ 0 (P2(prob)+11)
13. crE(I2∧¬SH) ≈ 0 (P2(prob)+12)
14. crE(I2∧¬SH) ≯ 0.5 (13)
C. ¬I2 (P4+14)
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